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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Chief among several questions presented by this 
criminal appeal is what showing a defendant must make to 
warrant an evidentiary hearing when moving for a new trial 
on the ground of newly discovered evidence of juror 
misconduct.  We are also called upon to consider the extent to 
which the Confrontation Clause entitles a defendant to cross-
examine government witnesses who testify pursuant to 
cooperation agreements about the sentence reductions they 
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expect to receive in exchange.  Because we conclude that the 
Defendant’s new trial motion did not make the requisite 
showing to warrant a hearing and that the District Court’s 
limitation on cross-examination did not contravene the 
Confrontation Clause, we will affirm. 
 
I. Background 
This appeal arises from a drug trafficking conspiracy 
in which several personnel at a Virgin Islands airport 
smuggled cocaine onto commercial flights bound for the 
United States mainland.  In August 2013, a federal grand jury 
returned an indictment charging Appellant Isa Noel, a ground 
services supervisor at St. Thomas’s Cyril E. King Airport, 
and three of his fellow airport personnel with conspiracy to 
possess with intent to distribute cocaine and related 
possession offenses.  After a three-day trial, the jury 
convicted Noel on all charges, and the District Court 
sentenced him to 151 months’ imprisonment.  More than a 
year later, Noel filed a motion for a new trial on the ground of 
newly discovered evidence of juror misconduct, which the 
District Court denied without a hearing. 
 
Noel timely appealed,1 challenging numerous orders 
across various stages of the proceedings but focusing 
                                              
1 After appealing from his convictions and sentence, 
Noel filed his new trial motion.  We remanded to the District 
Court, which entered an order denying the motion.  See Fed. 
R. App. P. 27; 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4.  Seeking to appeal that 
order as well, Noel filed a motion to recall the mandate and 
for leave to file supplemental briefing.  We granted that 
motion and now address both the merits of Noel’s original 
 
4 
primarily on the sufficiency of the evidence, the District 
Court’s rulings on cross-examination, and its denial of his 
motion for a new trial.  Before turning to the merits, we 
recount the proceedings pertinent to the challenged orders. 
 
A. The Trial  
1. Jury Selection 
During the preliminary proceedings, the District Court 
conducted voir dire and, over Noel’s objection, impaneled a 
security officer working on a contract basis for the U.S. 
Marshals Service.  In response to the District Court’s 
questioning, that officer—who later became Juror No. 11—
denied having a relationship by “blood, marriage[,] or 
business” with Noel or having “read or heard anything about 
th[e] case.”  App. 66–67.  But when the District Court asked 
whether any juror was “involved in the criminal justice 
system,” Juror No. 11 indicated that he was, which led to the 
following exchange: 
 
THE COURT:  Okay.  You raised your card . . . 
.  Tell us why. 
 
JUROR MEMBER:  I worked 26 years as a 
correction[s] officer and I [have] been involved 
in making the arrests and support and all that 
stuff. 
 
                                                                                                     
appeal and the denial of his new trial motion.  See 3d Cir. 
I.O.P. 7.2.   
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THE COURT:  Were you involved in any arrest 
in this case? 
 
JUROR MEMBER:  No. 
 
THE COURT:  All right.  You’re currently 
employed by whom? 
 
JUROR MEMBER:  I’m retired now but I have 
a contract with the U.S. [M]arshal[]s office. 
 
App. 76–77.  Although it elicited assurances that Juror No. 11 
could follow its instructions and remain impartial, the District 
Court did not inquire further into the juror’s specific duties 
with the U.S. Marshals Service, nor did Noel.   
 
Instead, citing the juror’s involvement “in law 
enforcement . . . [p]roviding security,” Noel moved to strike 
him from the jury.  App. 78.  After soliciting the 
Government’s position—that the juror “indicated he had no 
dealings with the[] particular defendants in th[e] case,” App. 
78—the District Court denied Noel’s motion; Juror No. 11 
was impaneled; and the parties proceeded to trial.   
 
2. The Evidence 
Over the course of the trial, the Government presented 
the testimony of Noel’s three former codefendants—Edisson 
Peguero Ortiz, Joelvis Acosta Liz (Acosta), and Kirsten 
Alexander—who had each since entered into plea agreements 
with the Government.  The Government also offered the 
testimony of an additional cooperating witness and several 
law enforcement officers as well as phone records, airport 
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surveillance footage, physical evidence, and a joint stipulation 
to the amount of cocaine seized by law enforcement.  
 
Ortiz and Acosta testified that they were involved in a 
cocaine distribution venture with Noel and that, as many as 
nine times, they received cocaine from a third party, 
facilitated its transportation through the airport into the 
baggage of ticketed passengers, and split the profits.  Noel’s 
role, they testified, was critical:  As a ground services 
supervisor, he had access to restricted doors, allowing them to 
bypass TSA checkpoints.  Their testimony was corroborated 
by a confidential informant and his law enforcement handler.  
The informant testified that, during a meeting at Acosta’s 
house, Acosta and Noel agreed to transport cocaine for him 
and that he twice gave them sham cocaine outside the airport, 
which was then returned to him inside the airport.  The 
handler, who surveilled the meetings and provided the sham 
cocaine, confirmed these facts. 
   
In addition to this evidence about the conspiracy’s 
structure and purpose, the jury heard about the particular 
transactions underlying Noel’s two possession charges.  The 
first transaction, Ortiz and Acosta testified, involved a foiled 
attempt to transfer six kilos of cocaine to a courier.  Ortiz 
gave the cocaine to Noel the night before, and Acosta and 
Noel transported it, concealed in their waistbands, from the 
employee locker room to the airport bathroom where they 
were met by the courier.  A surveilling law enforcement 
officer testified that he “pursued” the courier to “the handicap 
stall,” “climbed on the toilet next door and looked over,” and 
ultimately discovered the courier “standing in front of the 
toilet . . . on the phone,” with a “black[] suitcase sitting on the 
toilet,” “unzipped but not open.”  Second Addendum to App. 
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(Addendum) 373–74.  Inside that suitcase the law 
enforcement officer found several brick-shaped packages, 
which the Government introduced as evidence and which the 
parties stipulated amounted to approximately seven kilos of 
cocaine.2  The Government’s evidence also included airport 
surveillance footage that showed Acosta, Noel, and the 
courier walking to and from the bathroom in succession and 
phone records that reflected eighty-one calls made that day 
between Ortiz, Acosta, and a phone number that, although 
subscribed in a different name, the Government asked the 
jury to infer, “us[ing] [its] common sense,” was used by Noel.  
Addendum 510.   
 
The second transaction took a similar form but went a 
step further before also being thwarted.  In that instance, 
according to the testimony of codefendant Alexander, 
Alexander was at work at the airport in the employee break 
room when Noel, his supervisor, called him on the phone.  
Noel then came to the break room, asked Alexander to “take a 
package to one his friends . . . in the bathroom” inside the 
airport, and gave him access to do so through a restricted 
door.  Addendum 126.   
 
The “friend,” a courier who testified as a cooperating 
witness for the Government, explained that he received the 
cocaine from Alexander in a bathroom stall and then boarded 
a plane to Miami, and surveillance footage showed the pair 
walking to and from the bathroom.  The transaction was also 
                                              
2 Although Ortiz and Acosta estimated that the cocaine 
weighed six kilos, a lab analysis reflected a heavier weight to 
which the parties stipulated.   
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corroborated by phone records reflecting twelve calls made 
that day between Alexander and the same phone number used 
in the first transaction, as well as the testimony of a 
Homeland Security agent who described the courier as 
“appear[ing] visibly nervous” and “sweating profusely” after 
disembarking the plane in Miami.  Addendum 147.  Upon the 
courier’s arrest, agents recovered from his luggage a brick-
shaped package that the parties eventually stipulated 
amounted to about one kilo of cocaine and that was also 
introduced as a government exhibit.   
 
3. Cross-Examination Rulings 
 Because codefendants Ortiz, Acosta, and Alexander 
each testified pursuant to cooperation agreements with the 
Government, Noel attempted to undermine their credibility by 
cross-examining them about the sentence reductions they 
hoped to receive in exchange.  The District Court allowed 
some, but not all of the lines of questioning that Noel sought 
to pursue. 
 
 On the one hand, the District Court permitted each 
codefendant to confirm, in broad strokes, the benefits secured 
by their agreements.  Noel was able to question the 
codefendants about the reduction of otherwise substantial 
sentences, the Government’s agreement to drop or not pursue 
additional charges,3 the codefendants’ release from federal 
                                              
3 Acosta pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge as to 
seven kilos, despite personally possessing thirty-two, and the 
Government dropped a possession charge; Alexander pleaded 
guilty to misprision of a felony, and the Government dropped 
a conspiracy charge; and Ortiz pleaded guilty to conspiracy—
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custody pending sentencing, and the possibility of a greater 
sentence reduction, should their testimony be satisfactory.  In 
addition, each of the codefendants disclosed that they had 
reviewed the Government’s case against Noel prior to trial.   
 
On the other hand, the District Court foreclosed 
inquiry as to the codefendants’ precise sentencing exposure, 
explaining that this limitation was necessary to prevent the 
jury from inferring the sentence Noel himself was facing:  
  
Punishment is not ever something the jury is to 
have in their mind, so I’m not going to permit 
you to go into anything that gives some specific 
outline about what a sentence might be.  The 
defendant is on trial for a drug conspiracy, and 
this defendant pled guilty to a drug conspiracy. . 
. .  Now, if you want to suggest that he was . . . 
exposed to . . . a considerable amount of time, 
and he is, by his performance today he is 
essentially singing for his supper, you can 
certainly explore that.  But I’m not going to 
have you go into things like mandatory or 
specific sentences like 10 years or maximum of 
life . . . .  Because if it’s going into anything 
that deals with sentence or punishment, I don’t 
want the jury to be connecting up the dots and 
say: Well, here’s what Mr. Noel is facing. 
Addendum 24–25. 
                                                                                                     
the only charge for which he was indicted—but the 
Government agreed to reduce his exposure from about ten 
kilos to seven. 
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When it came time for closing arguments, Noel used 
the testimony he had elicited to impugn the codefendants’ 
veracity and motivation for testifying.  He described them, for 
example, as “self-confessed crooks, liars, [and] convicts . . . 
looking out for the best interests of only themselves,” and 
urged the jury to discredit their testimony because they had 
“one goal”—to “serve[] less jail time”—and their eyes were 
on the “golden trophy”: a recommendation from the 
Government “to reduce their substantial sentence[s] even 
further.”  Addendum 485–86. 
 
The jury deliberated for about four hours before 
reaching a guilty verdict on all counts.   
 
B. The New Trial Motion 
More than eighteen months after his convictions, Noel, 
alleging that he had recently discovered evidence of 
“significant juror misconduct,” filed a motion for a new trial.  
App. 32.  That motion explained that Noel had recently 
subpoenaed records from the U.S. Marshals Service, 
including a job description and time sheets that, according to 
Noel, cast doubt on the veracity of Juror 11’s responses at 
voir dire.  The job description revealed that Juror No. 11 
served as a “District Security Officer” responsible for, among 
other tasks, guarding federal detainees and transporting them 
to and from court.  App. 51.  The time sheets also indicated, 
without any further detail, that Juror No. 11 worked “in court 
with prisoners” on the date of Noel’s and two codefendants’ 
preliminary appearances and that he provided “support to the 
airlift” the following day and on the day another codefendant 
was arraigned.  App. 59, 61 (capitalization omitted).  Based 
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on those records, Noel hypothesized that Juror No. 11 
attended and transported Noel and his codefendants to and 
from those appearances and may have provided their 
transportation to other court proceedings.  Failing to disclose 
that information on voir dire, Noel asserted, reflected material 
dishonesty by Juror No. 11 and deprived Noel of the right to 
an impartial jury.   
 
The District Court was unconvinced.  Going so far as 
to “[a]ssum[e] that Juror No. 11 interacted with Noel while 
Juror No. 11 worked as a contract employee with the United 
States Marshals,” the District Court identified three pertinent 
voir dire questions that Juror No. 11 may have answered 
incorrectly: (1) whether he had a prior relationship with the 
defendant; (2) whether he had read or heard anything about 
the case; and (3) whether he had been involved in any arrest 
in the case.  Suppl. App. 34.  It reasoned, however, that 
because the juror “freely admitted” that he worked for the 
Marshals Service and Noel did not recognize the juror at trial, 
Juror No. 11 likely “did not recognize Noel either,” rendering 
his answers “even if incorrect,” still “honest[] respon[ses] to 
the Court’s inquiries.”  Suppl. App. 33–34.  The District 
Court therefore denied the new trial motion without a hearing, 
and this appeal followed. 
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231, and we have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review for abuse of discretion the 
District Court’s decision to deny a new trial motion, United 
States v. Cimera, 459 F.3d 452, 458 (3d Cir. 2006), and to 
limit cross-examination, United States v. Ellis, 156 F.3d 493, 
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498 (3d Cir. 1998), exercising plenary review where that 
discretion turns on the scope of the Confrontation Clause, 
United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 576 (3d Cir. 1998).  
We review the sufficiency of the evidence “from the 
perspective of a reasonable juror,” upholding the verdict “as 
long as it does not ‘fall below the threshold of bare 
rationality.’”  United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 
418, 431 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quoting Coleman v. 
Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 656 (2012) (per curiam)). 
 
III. Discussion 
Noel makes three principal arguments on appeal: (A) 
that the District Court’s limitation on the cross-examination 
of his codefendants violated his rights under the 
Confrontation Clause; (B) that the District Court abused its 
discretion in denying, without an evidentiary hearing, his new 
trial motion; and (C) that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the verdict.  We address these issues in turn.4 
                                              
4 We will not address in detail two additional 
arguments raised in Noel’s brief: (1) the introduction of 
certain phone records; and (2) his sentence, which Noel had 
argued should be vacated and remanded.  Because the phone 
records were largely cumulative of abundant properly-
admitted evidence, and counsel conceded at oral argument 
that they did not have “an overall bearing on the outcome of 
the trial,” Oral Arg. at 40:16–40:21, available at 
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/14-
2042_USAv.Noel.mp3, their admission cannot constitute 
prejudicial error, see United States v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403, 
416–17 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 695 (2017).  
As for his sentence, although Noel in his brief argued that we 
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A. The Cross-Examination Limitation 
Noel contends that the District Court, by precluding 
cross-examination on the specific details of his codefendants’ 
sentencing exposure, violated his rights under the 
Confrontation Clause.  However, because the District Court 
did permit cross-examination in more general terms about the 
codefendants’ sentencing reductions and other benefits of 
cooperation, and we are persuaded that this information was 
“sufficient . . . , without the excluded evidence, to make a 
discriminating appraisal of the possible biases and motivation 
of the witness[],” we perceive no error, much less 
constitutional error, in the limitation on cross-examination in 
this case.  United States v. Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 219 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (quoting Brown v. Powell, 975 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 
1992)). 
 
The Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal 
defendant the right to “be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.”  U.S. Const. Amend. VI.  Primary among those 
rights is “the right of cross-examination,” which may include 
questions “directed toward revealing possible biases, 
prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness.”  Davis v. 
                                                                                                     
should vacate and remand for resentencing in light of an 
intervening amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, counsel 
conceded at argument that Noel already “got the benefit” of 
that amendment.  Oral Arg. at 41:21–41:24.  And wisely so, 
because the District Court, anticipating its future adoption, 
sentenced Noel in accordance with the amendment.  Both of 
these arguments thus lack support in the record and were 
essentially withdrawn by Noel. 
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Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315–16 (1974) (citations omitted).  
Despite this guarantee, trial judges retain “wide latitude . . . to 
impose reasonable limits on . . . cross examination,” which a 
defendant may overcome by showing that, had the proposed 
line of inquiry been permitted, the jury “might have received 
a significantly different impression of [the witness’s] 
credibility.”  Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679–80 
(1986). 
 
In light of these principles, in United States v. 
Chandler, we derived from Van Arsdall a two-part test to 
determine whether a particular limitation on cross-
examination violated a defendant’s rights under the 
Confrontation Clause.  326 F.3d at 219.  First, we determine 
whether the limitation “significantly inhibited [the 
defendant’s] effective exercise of her right to inquire into 
[the] witness’s ‘motivation in testifying.’”  Id. (quoting Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678–79).  Then, if it did, we ask whether 
the limitation fell within “those ‘reasonable limits’ which a 
trial court, in due exercise of its discretion, has authority to 
establish.”  Id.  Whether the trial court abused its discretion, 
we explained, “depends on whether the jury had sufficient 
other information before it, without the excluded evidence, to 
make a discriminating appraisal of the possible biases and 
motivation of the witness[],” id. (citation omitted), or, 
conversely, whether without the limitation, “a reasonable jury 
could have ‘reached a significantly different impression’ of 
[the witness’s] credibility,” id. at 222 (quoting Van Arsdall, 
475 U.S. at 680). 
 
On the facts of Chandler, we concluded that the 
district court’s limitation violated the Confrontation Clause.  
There, the trial court allowed a witness to testify that he 
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pleaded guilty to carrying a smaller amount of drugs than he 
had actually carried and that he received only one month of 
house arrest plus probation even though the offense to which 
he pleaded guilty carried a possible twelve to eighteen-month 
sentence.  Id. at 221–22.  But the trial court did not permit 
testimony that, had the witness not cooperated with the 
Government, he may have faced “more than eight years in 
prison.”  Id. at 222.  Considering the extent of that 
discrepancy, we held that “the limited nature of [the 
witness’s] acknowledgment that he had benefited from his 
cooperation made that acknowledgment insufficient for a jury 
to appreciate the strength of his incentive to provide 
testimony that was satisfactory to the prosecution.”  Id.  At 
the same time, we were careful not to resolve “whether the 
Confrontation Clause entitles a defendant categorically to 
inquire into the ‘concrete terms’ of a cooperating witness’s 
agreement with the [G]overnment, including the specific 
sentence that witness may have avoided through his 
cooperation.”  Id. at 221. 
 
Two years later, in United States v. Mussare, we 
explicitly “decline[d] to . . . hold” that “such a categorical 
right exists.”  405 F.3d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 2005).  Because 
there, the trial court permitted extensive testimony regarding 
the plea agreement—including that the witness “expected to 
have all federal charges against him dismissed, face only state 
charges, and receive no jail time” and that “absent his 
cooperation, [the witness] would [have been] facing the exact 
same charges as [the defendants]”—we concluded that “the 
actual number of years in jail that [the witness] would 
otherwise have faced was not likely to have altered the jury’s 
impression of his motive for testifying.”  Id.  
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And more recently in United States v. John-Baptiste, 
where the district court had “allowed testimony regarding the 
witnesses’ agreements to cooperate with the [G]overnment 
and the fact that they expected to receive more lenient 
sentences in return,” we likewise concluded that its exclusion 
of testimony about “specific sentences that could have been 
imposed if the witnesses had refused to cooperate—a line of 
questioning that we have allowed trial courts to curtail”—was 
not likely to have altered the jury’s impression of credibility.  
747 F.3d 186, 212 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasis omitted). 
 
Together, these cases hold that there is no absolute 
right to inquire into the precise sentence a government 
witness might face absent his cooperation and that a district 
court may limit the scope of cross-examination to more 
general inquiries about his expected benefits.  Such limitation 
is permissible under the Confrontation Clause unless “the jury 
might have ‘received a significantly different impression of 
[the witness’s] credibility’” had it not been imposed, which 
we assess using Chandler’s two-part test.  326 F.3d at 219.  If 
the reviewing court determines that the jury indeed might 
have received a significantly different impression of the 
witness’s credibility, the trial court has necessarily exceeded 
the “‘reasonable limits’ which [it], in due exercise of its 
discretion, has authority to establish.”  Id. at 219.5 
                                              
5 As we make clear today, the question whether a 
reasonable jury “might have received a significantly different 
impression of [the witness’s] credibility,” Van Arsdall, 475 
U.S. at 680, pertains at the second step of the Chandler 
inquiry, i.e., whether the limitation fell within the bounds of 
the trial court’s discretion, not at the first step, i.e., whether 
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Here, the limitation imposed by the District Court fell 
comfortably within constitutional bounds.  As in Mussare and 
John-Baptiste, the District Court imposed a single narrow 
restriction:  It instructed defense counsel not to “go into 
                                                                                                     
the limitation “significantly inhibited” the defendant’s right to 
inquiry into the witness’s motivation for testifying.  Our 
precedent has not always been so clear on this point. 
Compare, e.g., Chandler 326 F.3d at 219 (explaining that the 
question whether a reasonable jury might have received a 
different impression of the witness’s credibility equates to 
“[w]hether a trial court has abused its discretion”), with id. at 
223 (proceeding, even after having concluded “a reasonable 
jury could have ‘reached a significantly different impression’ 
of [the witness’s] credibility,” to inquire whether the 
limitation “nevertheless fell within the District Court’s 
discretion”), and Mussare, 405 F.3d at 169 (interpreting 
Chandler to mean “that the proper inquiry under the first 
prong [i]s ‘whether . . . the jury might have received a 
significantly different impression of [the witness’s] 
credibility”).  However, once a defendant “show[s] that . . . 
[a] reasonable jury might have received a significantly 
different impression of [the witness’s] credibility had 
[defense] counsel been permitted to pursue his proposed line 
of cross-examination,” he already has “state[d] a violation of 
the Confrontation Clause.”  Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680.  
Thus, it would hardly make sense to ask at that point whether 
the limitation “nevertheless fell within the District Court’s 
discretion,” Chandler 326 F.3d at 223, for the bounds of a 
trial court’s discretion, broad as they may be, do not exceed 
those of the Constitution.   
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things like mandatory or specific sentences like 10 years or 
maximum of life, fines, or any of that sort of stuff.”  
Addendum 24.  But it expressly permitted counsel to explore 
the codefendants’ agreements with the Government, to elicit 
that they were “exposed to . . . a considerable amount of 
time,” and to suggest that, “by [their] performance today 
[they are] essentially singing for [their] supper.”  Addendum 
24.  Noel’s counsel did just that, eliciting from Ortiz, Acosta, 
and Alexander6 that the Government agreed to drop charges 
or significantly limit liability under existing charges, to 
release them from custody pending sentencing, and, as to 
Ortiz and Acosta, to refrain from bringing additional charges.  
And that testimony was sufficient for counsel to argue in 
closing that the codefendants were “self-confessed crooks, 
liars, [and] convicts” who had “one goal,” to serve less jail 
time, and would say anything to win the “golden trophy” of a 
recommendation “to reduce their substantial sentence[s] even 
further.”  App. 485–86. 
 
 In short, even assuming the District Court’s limitation 
“significantly inhibited” Noel’s exercise of his right to probe 
the codefendants’ “motivation in testifying,” Chandler, 326 
F.3d at 219, we cannot say on this record that the line of 
inquiry barred by that limitation might have given the jury a 
“significantly different impression of [the codefendants’] 
credibility,” id. at 221 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680).  
                                              
6 A fourth witness, Alan Pacquette, the courier who 
had been detained since his arrest in Miami, denied testifying 
pursuant to a cooperation agreement or in hope of a sentence 
reduction.   
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The limitation therefore did not violate the Confrontation 
Clause. 
 
B. Denial of the New Trial Motion 
Noel next contends that the District Court abused its 
discretion by denying, without a hearing, his motion for a 
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence of juror 
misconduct—namely, that Juror No. 11 allegedly provided 
false voir dire responses in view of the time sheets reflecting 
his work “in court with prisoners” and providing “support to 
the airlift” on dates when Noel or his codefendants had court 
proceedings.  App. 59, 61 (capitalization omitted).  To prevail 
on a motion for a new trial, the defendant must file the motion 
within fourteen days of the verdict unless the motion is 
grounded on “newly discovered evidence” and he must show 
that a new trial is in the interest of justice.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 
33.  But the decision whether to grant a new trial or a hearing 
on that motion rests in the district court’s discretion.7  
                                              
7 We have long recognized that the broad bounds of a 
district court’s discretion over a new trial motion encompass 
the determination whether an evidentiary hearing is 
necessary.  See United States v. Herman, 614 F.2d 369, 372 
(3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Iannelli, 528 F.2d 1290, 1294 
(3d Cir. 1976); accord United States v. Slatten, 865 F.3d 767, 
791–92 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Slough v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 1990 (2018).  And appellate review 
of that broad discretion as to post-trial allegations of juror 
misconduct—“[i]n contrast to allegations . . . made during a 
trial,” United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 306 (3d Cir. 
2011) (emphasis in original)—is particularly curtailed.  
Although “a call for a hearing has an inherently reasonable 
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McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 
556 (1984).  Where, as here, the motion is premised on an 
allegation of juror misconduct that was “newly discovered” 
more than a year after the verdict and the defendant contends 
he is entitled to a hearing on that motion, he must show both 
(1) that the evidence was indeed “newly discovered,” and (2) 
that it meets the standard we have set for a defendant to show 
that a “specific, nonspeculative impropriety has occurred.”  
United States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 301 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(citation omitted).  If both of these criteria are satisfied, a 
district court’s denial of the motion for a new trial without a 
hearing will be considered an abuse of discretion.  Here, 
however, Noel has satisfied neither. 
 
                                                                                                     
ring to it,” United States v. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 
1991), one that would recall discharged jurors strikes a more 
discordant note.  “It is qualitatively a different thing to 
conduct a voir dire during an ongoing proceeding at which 
the jury is part of the adjudicative process than to recall a jury 
months or years later for that purpose.”  Id. at 98 (italics 
added).  In view of this distinction, courts “are always 
reluctant to haul jurors in after they have reached a verdict in 
order to probe for potential instances of bias [or] 
misconduct.”  Fumo, 655 F.3d at 306 (quoting Gilsenan, 949 
F.2d at 97); accord United States v. Cornelius, 696 F.3d 
1307, 1324–25 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Vitale, 459 
F.3d 190, 197 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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1. No Hearing Was Warranted Because the 
Evidence Cannot be Deemed “Newly 
Discovered” 
First, Noel was not entitled to a hearing because the 
motion was not grounded on “newly discovered” evidence.  
“The test to determine whether evidence is ‘newly 
discovered’ is both objective and subjective . . . .”  Cimera, 
459 F.3d at 461.  “Evidence is not ‘newly discovered’ if it 
‘was [actually] known or could have been known by the 
diligence of the defendant or his counsel.’”  Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. Bujese, 371 F.2d 120, 125 
(3d Cir. 1967)); accord United States v. DeRewal, 10 F.3d 
100, 104 (3d Cir. 1993).  Only the objective element of that 
test is at issue here, because the Government does not contend 
that Noel, at trial, was subjectively aware of the evidence 
pertaining to Juror No. 11’s job duties.  The question, then, is 
whether this evidence would have been promptly investigated 
and discovered by reasonably diligent counsel given the 
juror’s disclosure of his employment with the U.S. Marshals 
Service. 
 
Diligence is a “relative term” that typically “depends 
on the circumstances of the case.”  Cimera, 459 F.3d at 461 
(citation omitted).  Time and again, we have confronted 
situations where we concluded that counsel’s failure to make 
further inquiry did not constitute reasonable diligence, but we 
did not articulate a standard by which to judge when notice is 
sufficient to require such further inquiry.  We do so today, for 
it cannot be that notice of any fact that could conceivably 
prompt further inquiry will defeat a finding of reasonable 
diligence, but without some benchmark, neither could we say 
with confidence how the notice measures up here.  A brief 
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review of our precedent is instructive in deriving a workable 
standard. 
 
In United States v. Iannelli, 528 F.2d 1290 (3d Cir. 
1976), we held that defendants did not diligently pursue 
evidence that the authorization for court-ordered electronic 
surveillance, through which the Government had obtained 
much of its evidence against them, was fraudulent.  Id. at 
1291, 1293.  Because “the matter of proper authorization was 
warmly contested” at trial and had the potential to render 
inadmissible evidence that was central to the prosecution, we 
reasoned that diligent counsel would have been prompted to 
“subject[] the initials to expert handwriting analysis” 
immediately, rather than waiting until after the defendants 
were convicted.  Id. at 1293. 
 
In United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1978), 
we concluded that a defendant was not diligent in obtaining 
statements from a witness who had appeared at trial but 
invoked his privilege against self-incrimination.  Id. at 145, 
148.  Although the witness was “the other principal 
participant in the activities for which [the defendant] had been 
convicted” and thus could have potentially provided powerful 
exculpatory testimony, id. at 145, the defendant failed to 
“pursue [the] resolution” of the asserted privilege “as part of a 
sustained effort to compel [the witness’s] testimony” at the 
time of trial, id. at 148.  When the defendant then attempted, 
after his convictions, to introduce an affidavit from that 
witness as newly discovered evidence, we concluded that “the 
defense never discharged its responsibility to act diligently in 
procuring the evidence on which it [was] now seek[ing] to 
base its motion for a new trial.”  Id. 
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Next, in United States v. Kelly, 539 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 
2008), we concluded that a defendant who made no effort to 
procure an acquaintance’s testimony in time for trial—
notwithstanding that the acquaintance’s presence at the 
defendant’s arrest and potential ability to corroborate his 
version of events gave him “every reason” to do so—did not 
act diligently in discovering the acquaintance’s later, 
exculpatory statement.  Id. at 184.  Although we recognized 
that the acquaintance may have been “unable[] or unwilling” 
to provide his testimony at trial, we rejected the notion that 
“potential or anticipated futility” excused the defendant from 
at least attempting to procure it given the realistic possibility 
that he could and the significance it held for the defense, 
concluding, “inaction simply does not qualify as reasonable 
diligence.”  Id. at 183–84. 
 
Finally, in United States v. Napolitan, 762 F.3d 297 
(3d Cir. 2014), we held that a defendant was not diligent in 
his alleged discovery that two witnesses at his trial had 
testified falsely.  Id. at 307.  We reasoned that the defense’s 
limited inquiry of the witnesses while they were on the stand 
and failure “to ask even a single question” regarding the 
relevant statements did not justify the delay in discovering 
only post-conviction that those statements were false, 
particularly because the subject matter was “central to [the] 
defense.”  Id. at 306–07. 
 
What we distill from these cases is that notice must 
rise above a certain threshold before a defendant will be 
faulted for failing to act with “reasonable diligence.”  After 
all, even the most zealous of counsel cannot be expected to 
inquire into every remote possibility and may reasonably 
prioritize the investigation of matters material to the defense 
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above those that seem peripheral.  Instead, drawing on 
Iannelli, Rocco, Kelly, and Napolitan, we hold that to satisfy 
the diligence standard, counsel must conduct further inquiry 
once the circumstances alert her to the existence of additional 
information that has a reasonable possibility of proving 
material to the defense.  And when the defense takes no 
action in the face of such notice, it has failed to “discharge[] 
its responsibility to act diligently in procuring the evidence on 
which it . . . seeks to base its motion for a new trial.”  Rocco, 
587 F.2d at 148. 
 
We note too that this standard, and the obligation it 
imposes on counsel, applies at voir dire no less than at trial.  
As “[o]ne touchstone of a fair trial is an impartial trier of 
fact,” McDonough, 464 U.S. at 554, juror misconduct is 
highly material to the defense.  And although “the obligation 
to impanel an impartial jury lies in the first instance with the 
trial judge,” United States v. Cunningham, 694 F.3d 372, 393 
(3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 
U.S. 182, 189 (1981)), advocates have obligations of their 
own, see McDonough, 464 U.S. at 550 n.2 (recognizing that 
defendants “would be barred from later challenging the 
composition of the jury when they had chosen not to 
interrogate [a juror] further upon receiving an answer which 
they thought to be factually incorrect”).  See generally ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense 
Function 4–7.3(a), (f) (4th ed. 2015) (describing defense 
counsel’s role in “discharg[ing] effectively the defense 
function in the selection of the jury,” such as by “request[ing] 
specific follow-up questions during the selection process 
when necessary to ensure fair juror selection”). 
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Of course, we would not fault a defendant for failing to 
inquire further into voir dire responses that raised no 
potentially material concerns at the time, yet later turned out 
to be demonstrably and materially false.  Cf. Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 440–44 (2000) (explaining, in the 
habeas context, that a juror’s deliberately misleading voir dire 
response excused counsel’s failure to develop a juror bias 
claim in state court).  But when the substance of a juror’s voir 
dire responses suggest a reasonable possibility that additional 
information would substantiate a potential conflict or bias, the 
defense has the responsibility to inquire further.8  It also has 
tools to do so at its disposal, including the ability either to 
“ask further questions that the court considers proper,” Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 24(a)(2)(A), or to “submit further questions that 
the court may ask if it considers them proper,” Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 24(a)(2)(B), or even to subpoena documents, Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 17.  A juror’s own failure to volunteer additional facts in 
that circumstance will “ha[ve] no bearing on the question of 
whether [the defendant] took affirmative steps to discover 
that testimony in the first instance.”  Kelly, 539 F.3d at 186.  
Rather, “the duty to conduct reasonable diligence,” at voir 
dire—while perhaps differing in degree, though not in kind 
from the duty at trial—“lies with the defendant and his 
counsel.”  Id. 
                                              
8 As our colleagues on the Fourth Circuit have put it, 
defendants may not “sandbag the courts by accepting jurors 
onto the panel without exploring on voir dire their possible 
sources of bias and then, if their gambit failed and they were 
convicted, challenging their convictions by means of post-
trial evidentiary hearings based on newly discovered evidence 
of possible juror bias.”  Billings v. Polk, 441 F.3d 238, 246 
(4th Cir. 2006). 
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We turn, then, to the question whether Noel satisfied 
that responsibility in this case, and we conclude he did not.  
At voir dire, Juror No. 11 openly admitted that he had a 
decades-long career as a corrections officer and that he was 
working at the time for the U.S. Marshals Service.  As that 
agency provided law enforcement and prisoner transportation 
services to the very courthouse in which the jury was being 
empaneled for trial, these disclosures alerted him that there 
was additional information available, such as supplemental 
voir dire responses, court records, and employment records 
that had a reasonable possibility of showing that Juror 11 had 
contact with Noel or his codefendants in the course of his job 
duties.  Thus, even if Noel at that point “had no reason to 
know the exact substance of [Juror 11’s] potential testimony, 
he had every reason to question [the juror] about [it].”  Id. at 
184.  Indeed, Noel in effect conceded as much on appeal by 
acknowledging that what prompted him to seek out Juror 11’s 
job description and time sheets eighteen months later was a 
“tip” that “this particular juror ha[d] a background in law 
enforcement,” Oral Arg. at 10:23–10:27, 11:32–11:46—the 
very same information, that is, that he had in his possession at 
the time of voir dire.   
 
In sum, Noel was on notice before Juror 11 was ever 
impaneled of the existence of additional information that had 
a reasonable possibility of proving material to the defense, 
and in that circumstance, “[s]itting on [his] hands and 
waiting” for the District Court sua sponte to inquire or for 
Juror No. 11 to spontaneously say more “cannot be 
considered—by any definition—reasonable diligence.”  Kelly, 
539 F.3d at 186.  Because Noel’s motion was not filed on the 
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basis of “newly discovered” evidence, the District Court did 
not err in denying it without a hearing. 
 
2. No Hearing Was Warranted for the 
Additional Reason That Noel’s Evidence 
Was Insufficient  
Noel was not entitled to a hearing for the additional 
reason that he failed to meet the evidentiary standard we 
established in United States v. Claxton for showing that a 
“specific, nonspeculative impropriety has occurred.”9  766 
                                              
9 Where a defendant alleges that a juror was dishonest 
at voir dire, the ultimate showing required, that is, the one 
that would warrant vacating the judgment and granting a new 
trial, is (1) that “a juror failed to answer honestly a material 
question on voir dire”; and (2) that “a correct response would 
have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.”  
McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556; accord Warger v. Shauers, 135 
S. Ct. 521, 525 (2014).  That two-part test balances the right 
to an impartial jury against the countervailing interest of 
finality:  Although “[v]oir dire . . . serves to protect” the right 
to a “fair trial [by] an impartial trier of fact,” and “the 
necessity of truthful answers . . . [to] this process . . . is 
obvious,” “[t]o invalidate the result of a [lengthy] trial 
because of a juror’s mistaken, though honest response” would 
undercut the “investment of private and social resources” and 
“the important end of finality.”  McDonough, 464 U.S. at 
554–55.  But Noel does not contend that his new trial motion, 
on its face, satisfied both McDonough prongs.  Rather, he 
argues that the District Court erred in denying that motion 
without holding an evidentiary hearing to verify his 
allegations that Juror No. 11 made false statements at voir 
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F.3d at 301 (citation omitted).  In that case, we embraced the 
formulation in United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 
2006), and held that the defendant must show “clear, strong, 
substantial and incontrovertible evidence that a specific, 
nonspeculative impropriety has occurred” to warrant a 
hearing on a motion for new trial.  Claxton, 766 F.3d at 301 
(quoting Stewart, 433 F.3d at 302–03).  But the evidence 
there “establish[ed] only that, at some unspecified time in the 
past, [the juror] worked with both a government and defense 
witness,” and thus it “d[id] not indicate . . . any possible basis 
for bias beyond having shared a former employer” or “offer[] 
. . . more than speculation that [the juror] even knew the 
witnesses, much less that the juror was biased in the 
[G]overnment’s favor.”  Id.  We had little need, therefore, to 
scrutinize our formulation or to elaborate on the showing it 
requires.  We have such occasion today. 
 
As a threshold matter, we clarify, as has the Second 
Circuit, that the defense need not provide literally 
“incontrovertible” evidence of juror misconduct, id., for if 
“[t]he requirements of ‘strong, substantial and 
incontrovertible evidence’ . . . demand[ed] that the allegations 
be irrebuttable[,] . . . there would be no need for a hearing.”  
United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1989). 
   
At the same time, the evidentiary standard for 
obtaining a hearing on a new trial motion is necessarily a high 
                                                                                                     
dire and otherwise would have been discharged for cause.  
Thus, we focus here on the threshold showing required for a 
hearing.   
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one given the interests at stake.  On the one hand, we have the 
“obvious” need for “truthful answers by prospective jurors” 
in impaneling “impartial trier[s] of fact,” McDonough, 464 
U.S. at 554, and the proper function of a hearing in this 
context, “to determine what happened, that is to establish the 
historical record,” United States v. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 90, 97 
(3d Cir. 1991).  On the other hand, due respect must be 
accorded a fully litigated jury trial—which involves “an 
important investment of private and social resources,” 
McDonough, 464 U.S. at 555, implicates “the important end 
of finality,” id., and makes us “reluctant to haul jurors in after 
they have reached a verdict in order to probe for potential 
instances of bias,” United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 306 
(3d Cir. 2011).  Thus, while the evidence of juror misconduct 
need not be literally “incontrovertible” to warrant a hearing, it 
still must constitute “clear, strong, [and] substantial” evidence 
of a “specific, nonspeculative impropriety.”  Claxton, 766 
F.3d at 301 (citation omitted). 
 
That standard can be met in a variety of ways.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Vitale, 459 F.3d 190, 193–94, 199–200 
(2d Cir. 2006) (involving attorney correspondence confessing 
previously undisclosed connections between a juror and the 
prosecution); United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 628, 632–
35 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (involving a prosecution’s investigation 
concluding that a juror lied at voir dire about a prior felony); 
Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543 (involving juror affidavits 
“alleging specific acts of inappropriate conduct”).  But 
conjecture is not among them:  A district court does not abuse 
its discretion in denying a motion for a new trial without a 
hearing where the defendant “offers nothing more than 
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speculation” of juror misconduct.10  Claxton, 766 F.3d at 301; 
accord United States v. Easter, 981 F.2d 1549, 1553 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (finding a hearing unnecessary on a motion “based 
on pure conjecture”). 
 
Ultimately, however, that is all Noel has offered here.  
To be sure, the records he eventually obtained show that Juror 
No. 11 was working at the courthouse on certain dates when 
Noel and his codefendants were transported or had court 
appearances and, thus, it is indeed possible that Juror No. 11 
was assigned to their matters.  But Noel made no effort to 
substantiate that possibility, or even to raise it from 
possibility to probability.  While he could have sought to do 
so through a variety of means—for example, affidavits, cf. 
Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543, or credible reports, cf. Boney, 977 
F.2d at 632–35, or even his own attestation based on personal 
observations about the relative size of the courthouse, number 
of courtrooms, or number of court proceedings—he rested his 
motion instead on records showing only that Juror No. 11 was 
working on some of the same days that Noel and his co-
defendants were processed and that they therefore might have 
crossed paths. 
 
                                              
10 Of course, there are also many other circumstances 
when a district court might forgo a hearing, such as where the 
motion is capable of resolution on the existing record, e.g., 
United States v. Richards, 241 F.3d 335, 344 (3d Cir. 2001), 
grounded on evidence that is not newly discovered, e.g., id. at 
343; United States v. Forbes, 790 F.3d 403, 411 (2d Cir. 
2015), or based on allegations that, even if true, would not 
lead to relief, e.g., Fumo, 655 F.3d at 306–07; Gilsenan, 949 
F.2d at 97. 
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And more to the point, none of those records 
constituted “clear, strong, [and] substantial” evidence of false 
voir dire responses, Claxton, 766 F.3d at 301 (citation 
omitted).  In response to the District Court’s inquiries, Juror 
No. 11 indicated that he did not (1) have a relationship with 
the defendant, (2) read or hear anything about the case, or (3) 
have any involvement with any arrest in the case.  But the 
“newly discovered” job description and time sheets do not 
show that those responses were inaccurate, much less 
dishonest, and in the context of a motion that would 
undermine the finality of a jury verdict, the District Court was 
within its discretion to investigate no further.11  Having 
presided over the voir dire proceeding, having observed the 
prospective jurors, and having reviewed the voir dire 
transcript and the purported “newly discovered evidence” on 
which Noel based his new trial motion, the District Court 
                                              
11 It is not unreasonable to think, as the District Court 
surmised, that even if Juror No. 11 did have contact with Noel 
or his codefendants, he either did not notice or did not recall 
by the time of trial, about four months later.  But had there 
been objective evidence that the juror’s responses were not 
accurate, such suppositions might not be sufficient to forgo a 
hearing.  As the Second Circuit observed in Stewart, “if any 
significant doubt as to a juror’s impartiality remains in the 
wake of objective evidence of false voir dire responses, an 
evidentiary hearing generally should be held,” 433 F.3d at 
306, but “[t]he inquiry should end whenever it becomes 
apparent to the trial judge that reasonable grounds to suspect 
prejudicial jury impropriety do not exist,” id. at 303 (citation 
omitted). 
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reasonably concluded that Noel had not produced the 
requisite “clear, strong, [and] substantial” evidence that a 
“specific, nonspeculative impropriety ha[d] occurred,” id. 
(citation omitted), and we will defer to that finding in light of 
the District Court’s “intimate familiarity with the facts of 
th[e] case,” Gov’t of the V.I. v. Lima, 774 F.2d 1245, 1251 (3d 
Cir. 1985). 
 
* * * 
 
In sum, both because Noel failed to establish that his 
new trial motion was grounded on newly discovered 
evidence, that is, on evidence that could not have been 
discovered through counsel’s reasonable diligence, and 
because he failed to produce “clear, strong, [and] substantial” 
evidence that a “specific, nonspeculative impropriety ha[d] 
occurred,” Claxton, 766 F.3d at 301 (citation omitted), we 
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
when it declined to hold a hearing and denied Noel’s motion 
for a new trial. 
 
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Finally, Noel’s challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence is meritless.  As for the conspiracy charge, the 
Government amply demonstrated “(1) a shared unity of 
purpose; (2) an intent to achieve a common illegal goal; and 
(3) an agreement to work toward that goal.”  Caraballo-
Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 425.  Ortiz testified that he, Acosta, 
and Noel had an “agreement” to distribute cocaine for profit, 
Addendum 8, and Noel’s codefendants testified to his 
essential role and the sharing of profits among the 
coconspirators.  See United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 
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199–200 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that “repeated, familiar 
dealings” support the inference of a defendant’s knowledge of 
her role in a larger operation). 
 
Likewise, the trial record is replete with evidence 
supporting the substantive counts of possession with intent to 
distribute.  On the first count, trial testimony established that 
Noel received six kilos of cocaine that he and Acosta 
transferred the next day from the employee locker room to a 
courier in the bathroom.  As to the second, Alexander 
testified that, at Noel’s direction, he delivered a package of 
cocaine to Noel’s “friend,” who then flew to Miami and was 
arrested after the cocaine was found in his luggage.  That is to 
say nothing of the testimony of the confidential informant and 
law enforcement agents, as well as airport surveillance video 
footage, phone records, and the parties’ stipulations to the 
amount of cocaine seized by law enforcement.  In sum, “[t]he 
evidence was more than sufficient; it was overwhelming.”  
United States v. Burnett, 773 F.3d 122, 135 (3d Cir. 2014). 
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Noel’s 
convictions and sentence. 
